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CASE NOTES
meantime, the court's decision in Bishop voiding lex loci delicti
and substituting the significant relationship test is reminiscent of
the predicament of Lewis Carroll's Alice: "It sounded an excellent
plan, no doubt, and very neatly and simply arranged; the only diffi-
culty was, that she had not the smallest idea how to set about it.'' 8
JERRY J. WAXMAN
TortS-WRONGFUL DEATH OF A MINOR CHILD-CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF DECEDENT SPOUSE DOES NOT BAR RECOVERY BY
NON-NEGLIGENT SPOUSE IN THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A MINOR
CHILD, Singletary v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 376 So.
2d 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
The plaintiff father in Singletary v. National Railroad Passen-
ger Corp.' brought a wrongful death action when his wife and two
minor children were killed in an accident at a railroad crossing in
Avon Park. The accident occurred when a train owned by the de-
fendant Amtrack collided with a vehicle operated by the wife of
the plaintiff and occupied by their two children.2 The wife and
children died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident.' The
plaintiff father brought the action on behalf of each of the dece-
dents' estates and on his own behalf as survivor of each to recover
damages for the alleged negligence of the railroad in causing the
deaths.4
The jury found the railroad sixty-five percent negligent and Sin-
gletary's wife thirty-five percent negligent.6 In entering the final
judgment for awards for the wrongful deaths, the plaintiff argued
that the court should only reduce the amounts awarded to the
wife's estate and the husband as her survivor in proportion to the
percentage of the wife's negligence, and that no reduction should
be made in the amounts awarded to the father as survivor of the
53. Shapira, "Grasp All, Lose All": On Restraint and Moderation in the Reformulation
of Choice of Law Policy, 77 COLUM. L. Rzv. 248, 251 (1977), citing L. CARROLL, ALICz'S
ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND.
1. 376 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
2. Brief for Appellant at 1.
3. 376 So. 2d at 1192.
4. Brief for Appellant at 1.
5. 376 So. 2d at 1192.
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children or to the estates of the children.' This reasoning, accord-
ing to the plaintiff, reflected the appropriate interpretation of the
Florida Wrongful Death Act and the doctrine of imputed compara-
tive negligence.7 The defendant railroad argued that all awards to
the father, as survivor of his wife and children, and to the estates
of the wife and the children, should be reduced in proportion to
the percentage of negligence attributed to the wife.8 The court
agreed with the defendant and reduced all awards to the father as
survivor and to the individual estates.'
Singletary appealed the reduction in the awards granted to him
as survivor of the children and to their estates, arguing that the
mother's negligence should only reduce his derivative claim as her
survivor-husband and not his claims as survivor of the children.10
The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
damages awarded to the father as survivor of his minor children
were not to be reduced in proportion to the percentage of fault
attributed to the decedent wife; hence, the negligence of the
mother was not to be imputed to the father." By awarding the full
amounts of damages to the father, the court deviated from the
well-established position in Florida which had barred all recovery
to a parent when the other parent was found to be contributorily
negligent in the death of their child, 3 a view that had remained
6. Id.
7. Brief for Appellant at 3.
8. Brief for Appellee at 2.
9. 376 So. 2d at 1192. Damages were as follows:
The Estate of Nancy Singletary
$14,370.18
Donald Singletary as Survivor of
Nancy Singletary
225,000.00
The Estate of Matthew Singletary
2,170.17
Donald Singletary as Survivor of
Matthew Singletary
80,000.00
The Estate of Jennifer Singletary
958.49
Donald Singletary as Survivor of
Jennifer Singletary
80,000.00
10. Brief for Appellant at 3.
11. 376 So. 2d at 1194. The court affirmed reduction of damages due plaintiff as survivor
of his wife and to her estate.
12. Martinez v. Rodriquez, 410 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142
(Fla. 1970); Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
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unchallenged since Florida's adoption of comparative negligence in
1973.13 The purpose of this note is to show that the district court
correctly found that the revised version of the Florida Wrongful
Death Act"' allows for recovery to a non-negligent parent when the
other parent's negligence has contributed to the death of a minor
child. The recovery should no longer be reduced by the percentage
of the parent's negligence under the doctrine of imputed compara-
tive negligence.
Recovery to parents for the wrongful death of a minor child was
denied at common law on the theory that the private wrong
merged into the crime which had caused the death of the child."5
To change the common law doctrine, an act was passed by the
Florida Legislature in 1899 allowing recovery to parents for the
wrongful death of a minor child.11 The statute required that the
claim be brought by the father on behalf of himself and the mother
for the loss of the child's services and for the mental pain and suf-
fering of the parents. 7 Only in the event that the father did not
survive the child was the mother allowed to state a separate
claim."5 The courts interpreted the requirement of an indivisible
claim to bar recovery by both parents where the negligence of one
was a contributing factor in the death of the child.19
13. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
14. Ch. 72-35 1972 Fla. Laws 174. The Florida Wrongful Death Act was first enacted as
ch. 3439, 1883 Fla. Laws 59, patterned after Lord Campbell's Act, an Act for Compensating
the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846). The Florida Wrong-
ful Death to a Minor Act was passed as ch. 4722, 1899 Fla. Laws 114. Amended, ch. 6487,
1913 Fla. Laws 300. (Current version at FRA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1979)). Prior to its revi-
sion, the section read as follows:
[T]he father of such minor child, or if the father be not living, the mother may
maintain an action against such individual, private association of persons, or cor-
poration, and may recover, not only for the loss of services of such minor child,
but, in addition thereto, such sum for the mental pain and suffering of the parent
(or both parents) if they survive, as the jury may assess.
Ch. 6487, 1913 Fla. Laws at 301. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Knowles, 109 So. 219 (Fla. 1926).
At common law, the father could recover for loss of services of an injured child, but not for
the death of a minor child; hence the passage of the Florida statute. Stokes v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695, 697 (Fla. 1968); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 53 So. 718 (Fla.
1910).
15. A right of action for wrongful death did not exist at common law. Baker v. Bolton,
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808). Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 53 So. 718 (Fla. 1910).
16. Ch. 4722, 1899 Fla. Laws 114. Repealed, ch. 72-35, 1972 Fla. Laws 174. (Current
version at FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1979)).
17. 1913 Fla. Laws 300, 301. The statute did not authorize an award to the parent as heir
to the child's estate.
18. Id.
19. Martinez v. Rodriquez, 410 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142
(Fla. 1970); Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
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The Florida Wrongful Death Act was completely revised in 1972.
The 1899 section relating to the wrongful death of a minor was
repealed and a new section adopted which substantially modified
the act. 20 The new Wrongful Death Act makes significant changes
in the law.'1 In an action for the wrongful death of a minor, it no
longer requires that suit be brought by the father on behalf of him-
self and the mother for loss of services and mental pain and suffer-
ing." Indivisible damages to the parents are not required because
parents may now bring individual claims. The benefit to each sur-
vivor, and each survivor's claim, is stated separately by the jury."
The case of Singletary v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.'4
represents the first instance in which a court has acknowledged
that the new statute enables a parent to recover for the wrongful
death of his child even though the other parent's negligence had
contributed to the child's death. 5
The doctrine of comparative negligence,' 6 as related to wrongful
death, also played a significant role in the Singletary decision. The
Court's acceptance of the father's contention, that the award for
the death of his children should not be reduced by the percentage
of the mother's negligence, presents a clear view of the doctrine of
imputed comparative negligence in wrongful death cases.'"
20. Ch. 72-35, 1972 Fla. Laws 174, repealed FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01-.03 and enacted FLA.
STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 effective July 1, 1972, hereinafter cited as the Florida Wrongful Death
Act.
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1979).
22. FLA. STAT. § 768.21(1) and (4) (1979) read as follows:
(1) Each survivor may recover the value of lost support and services from the
date of the decedent's injury to his death, with interest, and future loss of support
and services from the date of death and reduced to present value. In evaluating
loss of support and services, the survivor's relationship to the decedent, the
amount of the decedent's probable net income available for distribution to the
particular survivor, and the replacement value of the decedent's services to the
survivor may be considered. In computing the duration of future losses, the joint
life expectancies of the survivor and the decedent and the period of minority, in
the case of healthy minor children, may be considered. (Emphasis added)
(4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may also recover for mental pain and
suffering from the date of injury. (Emphasis added)
23. FLA. STAT. § 768.22 (1979). Parents may also recover the decedent's lost earnings and
medical and funeral expenses through the estate, FLA. STAT. § 768.21(6)(a) and (b) (1979).
24. 376 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
25. Id. at 1194.
26. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). See generally V. SwARTz, CoMPARATnW
NEGLIGENCE (1974); FLA. BAR, ComPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRmUTION IN FLORIDA
(1977).
27. 376 So. 2d at 1194.
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The effect of imputed negligence in a wrongful death action
must be distinguished from its effect in a personal injury action.
Since Florida's adoption of comparative negligence in 1973, s full
awards have been granted in personal injury cases to the non-neg-
ligent parent, with imputed negligence only playing a role when
agency or joint enterprise was involved." In all cases prior to 1973
involving parental negligence in the wrongful death of a child,
however, the courts permitted no award to the non-negligent par-
ent. Since 1973, no appellate court in Florida had reached the issue
of imputed negligence between parents in a wrongful death action
until Singletary.
The repealed section of the Florida Wrongful Death Act was the
basis for the two leading cases regarding parental negligence in the
wrongful death of a minor child.n Klepper v. Breslins' involved
the death of a minor child who was hit by a car as he darted across
the street in front of his home. In a suit against the driver, the
father was held accountable for the negligence of the mother, and
thus both parents were barred from recovery.3' The defendant con-
tended that the mother had failed to maintain adequate supervi-
sion and control of the child by allowing him to play unattended
and that the father was aware of the mother's negligence.3 3 The
supreme court cited the peculiarity of the Florida Wrongful Death
Act which required the father to sue on behalf of the mother for
the wrongful death of their child, stressing the indivisibility of the
award and the imputation of the mother's negligence to the
father.3 4
In Martinez v. Rodriquez," the Klepper decision was made
more stringent by holding that the mother's negligence was a bar
to the father's recovery for the wrongful death of their child even
though the father neither knew nor should have known of the
mother's negligent supervision. In Martinez, the father had not
28. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
29. For a discussion of the elements of joint enterprise, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, Joint Enterprise § 491 (1965).
30. See note 14, supra.
31. 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
32. Id. at 593.
33. Id. at 590.
34. Id. at 591.
35. 410 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969). The imputed negligence issue was certified to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, 394 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1968), with response by the court, 215 So. 2d 305
(Fla. 1968).
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even been present in the United States prior to the child's death
by drowning in the swimming pool of the apartment complex
where the mother and child lived. 6 Despite the father's lack of
knowledge, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Klepper deci-
sion and again stressed that its decision was based upon the peculi-
arity of the Florida statute which precluded apportionment of
damages between the parents. 7
The decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Orefice v. Albert
continued the precedent established by Klepper and Martinez
when it denied recovery to a mother whose minor son was killed in
a plane negligently piloted by his father.8 8 The supreme court up-
held the lower court in denying the mother's recovery on her own
behalf, stating that the mother's action in entrusting custody and
control of her son to the father was a sufficient community of in-
terest to permit the father's negligence to be imputed to her as the
surviving parent. The Orefice decision made no reference to the so-
called "peculiarity" of the statute relating to wrongful death to mi-
nors as emphasized in Klepper and Martinez, but instead, relied
on the community of interest aspect, which was not stressed in ei-
ther of the earlier cases.8 '
The trial court in Singletary followed the precedent of imputed
negligence established in Klepper and Martinez and then applied
the comparative negligence theory in its reduction of the awards
by the percentage of negligence. 0 The Second District Court of
Appeal, by reversing the trial court, has released the trial courts of
that district from precedents founded on the repealed section of
the Florida Wrongful Death Act and charted a new direction, tak-
ing notice of the comparative negligence doctrine, yet refusing to
impute negligence to the non-negligent parent.4'1 If, indeed, the key
determinant in Singletary, in allowing recovery to the non-negli-
gent parent, is the repeal of chapter 427742 within the old wrongful
death act, then the 1972 revisions must have significant ramifica-
tions.48 Since the earlier precedents of Klepper and Martinez were
36. 394 F.2d at 159.
37. 215 So. 2d at 307. See note 14, supra.
38. Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970). In Orefice, the suit by the mother on
behalf of the child was allowed but only against the co-owner of the plane and not against
the decedent father due to interfamily immunity. Id. at 146.
39. Id. at 145.
40. 376 So. 2d at 1192.
41. Id. at 1194.
42. 1899 Fla. Laws 114.
43. The offending section was not the prime target of the Florida Revision Commission
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based on the wording of the old statute, then the Singletary case
stands as a noteworthy beacon recognizing the change in the stat-
ute and alerting trial courts to the fact that the traditionally cited
cases of Klepper and Martinez are no longer good law. Singletary
also places Florida in step with the majority of other states." Con-
trary to statements in Klepper'5 and Singletary," a minority of
other jurisdictions, notably community property states, bar recov-
ery in toto when one parent or beneficiary is contributorily negli-
gent in a wrongful death action.'
An Illinois statute requires a single assessment of damages, as
did Florida, and contributory negligence of one of several benefi-
ciaries bars recovery for all.'8 In certain other states, without such
a statute, recovery is still barred.'4
The Singletary decision also puts wrongful death claims by a
non-negligent parent in accord with personal injury claims that in-
volve a child injured due to the comparative negligence of one par-
ent. In Ward v. Baskin,50 the Florida Supreme Court distinguished
wrongful death from personal injury in its award of expenses to the
father when his child was injured in an automobile accident. The
child was a passenger in the mother's car, and the mother was
or the Florida Legislature, whose main objective was to eliminate the multiplicity of suits
which could be brought under the old act and to avoid the rigid hierarchy of those entitled
to bring suit. For death of a minor child, three suits could be brought under FLA. STAT. §§
768.02, 768.03, and 46.021 (1971). See Wilcox & Melville, The Computation of Damages
under the new Florida Wrongful Death Act, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1972).
The constitutionality of FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1979) was upheld in Martin v. United
Security Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975).
44. 376 So. 2d at 1194, citing Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785 (1948); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 670
(1923); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 493, 494A (1965).
45. 83 So. 2d at 591.
46. 376 So. 2d at 1193.
47. Annot. 23 A.L.R. 690 (1923); Annot. 2 A.L.R.2d 785 (1948). See Atlanta & C. Air-
Line Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 20 S.E. 550 (Ga. 1894).
48. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956), overturning Hazel v. Hoopeston-Dan-
vile Motor Bus Co., 141 N.E. 392 (IMI. 1923); Henry v. Robert KetteUl Constr. Corp., 226
N.E.2d 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967).
49. Recovery may be denied on the grounds that the award would be community prop-
erty and the negligent parent should not profit from his wrongdoing. Keena v. United R.Rs.,
207 P. 35 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922); Crevelli v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 167 P. 66 (Wash.
1917). But see Baca v. Baca, 379 P.2d 765, 771 (N.M. 1963), where the award was held not
to be community property and negligence was not imputed. The community property ratio-
nale for imputed negligence has been held inapplicable where the negligent parent is not a
survivor, Michie v. Calhoun, 336 P.2d 370, 373-74 (Ariz. 1959).
Another basis for imputing negligence is the doctrine of marital unity, discussed in Sin-
gletary, 376 So. 2d at 1194, This doctrine has been criticized, see PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
914 (4th ed. 1971), and rejected by Florida, Ward v. Baskin, 94 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 1957).
50. 94 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1957).
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found contributorily negligent. The Court stated that Klepper v.
Breslin was a wrongful death action and, therefore, did not apply.
The marital relationship alone was ruled insufficient to impute
negligence between parents in an injury action.51 In the more re-
cent case of Acevedo v. Acosta," the father's claim for medical ex-
penses for his son's injuries was allowed despite the comparative
negligence of the mother. The son was injured while a passenger in
a car driven by his mother. In the ensuing trial, the mother as
driver was found comparatively negligent, yet the father was al-
lowed full reimbursement for the medical expenses he incurred as
a result of his son's injuries. The father's derivative claim for the
mother's injuries, however, was reduced by her degree of negli-
gence." Similarly, in Singletary, the husband's derivative award as
survivor of his wife was reduced by the degree of her comparative
negligence, and this portion of the trial court decision was not
appealed."
The death of a child has harsh and irreparable repercussions on
a family. The failure to compensate innocent parents under the
Klepper and Martinez line of cases has been deemed unpalatable
since the precedent was set." The courts, however, felt compelled
to adopt this rule which denied award to the non-negligent parent
because of the strictures of the old wrongful death statute and the
pre-1973 doctrine of contributory negligence." In Singletary, the
Second District Court of Appeal has now recognized that it is no
longer constrained by the offending statute, and that it may now
grant full award to the non-negligent parent.57
If the Singletary court is wrong, and the Klepper and Martinez
view, modified by comparative negligence, prevails, then the courts
of Florida must continue to impute the negligence of one parent to
51. Id. at 860-61.
52. 296 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
53. Id. at 527, 529-30.
54. 376 So. 2d at 1192.
55. In a strong dissent in Klepper, Chief Justice Drew noted that jurisdictions which
imputed negligence between parents in the death of a child were those which had previously
recognized the rule of imputed negligence, or which did so on the basis of community prop-
erty laws. Since neither of these doctrines were viable in Florida, Chief Justice Drew de-
scribed the Klepper holding as "contrary to principles long settled in this state." 83 So. 2d
587, 594-95 (Fla. 1955). Dissenting in Martinez, Justice Ervin agreed with the Klepper dis-
sent and also expressed concern that the imputed negligence between parents rule might be
in violation of Florida's constitutional provision guaranteeing access to the courts (current
version at FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21). 215 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1968).
56. See note 14, supra.
57. 376 So. 2d at 1194.
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the other in a wrongful death action and reduce the awards accord-
ingly. The reader of the Martinez case is left frustrated and con-
cerned at the harsh result, one which approaches punishment of a
bereaved parent who had no part in the tragic death of his child.
His grief, and his loss of the child's companionship and love, was
just as great regardless of the negligence of the other parent. Al-
though comparative negligence has mitigated the total bar to re-
covery reached in Klepper and Martinez, results such as those
reached by the trial court in Singletary will continue to plague the
conscience of the court if the avenue of escape in the revised
wrongful death act is not recognized.
If the Singletary view prevails, however, the courts can then
award the non-negligent parent as survivor of his child, just as
they do in personal injury actions." This is a more logical and hu-
mane approach than reached under the Klepper rule. It is also in
step with the majority of other jurisdictions which allow recovery
by the non-negligent parent in both personal injury and wrongful
death actions involving a minor child.
JULIA S. CHAPMAN
Water and Watercourses-PBLIC UsE-THE EFFECT OF PROP-
ERTY LAW AS A LIMITATION ON FEDERAL NAVIGATIONAL SERVI-
TUDE-Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
In 1961, Kaiser Aetna entered into an agreement with Bishop
Estate to develop a 6,000 acre area known today as Hawaii Kai on
the island of Oahu, Hawaii.1 The development agreement gave
Kaiser Aetna the right to lease Kuapa Pond, a 523 acre area
58. See Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Ward v. Baskin,
94 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1957).
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 167 (1979).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Fishponds, regarded under Hawaiian property law as private property, were frequently
found within the boundaries of large land units called "Ahupua'as." Kuapa Pond, a
fishpond, was included in the Ahupua'a that eventually vested in Bishop Estate.
In its original state, Kuapa Pond was a shallow body of water contiguous to Maunalua
Bay and the Pacific Ocean but separated from the bay by a narrow barrier beach. The pond
was subject to the ebb and flow of the tide because of two natural openings in the barrier
beach and also because the tidal waters percolated through the beach into the pond.
For centuries prior to 1961, Kuapa Pond was used for aquatic agriculture. Early
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